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SQUEEZE-OUTS AND FREEZE-OUTS IN
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In only six years since the Internal Revenue Service gave its blessing to
the limited liability company (LLC), 1 statutes providing for this new
business entity have spread across the country. Presently, all but a few
states have such laws.2 With its combination of limited liability for the
owners and partnership-style flow-through tax treatment, the LLC provides
an attractive option for closely held businesses. 3 Indeed, it is not beyond
the realm of reality to suggest that before too long the LLC may largely
render the partnership, limited partnership and closely held corporation
obsolete.
While this new business form raises many questions, a most appropriate
one for this symposium is to consider the prospects for squeeze-outs and
freeze-outs in LLCs. After all, Professor O'Neal wrote the book (both
literally and figuratively) on the subject of corporate squeeze-outs and
freeze-outs. 4 As Professor O'Neal's work detailed, these phenomena have
plagued the world of closely held corporations. Will they do the same with
LLCs?
Not much has been written in the literature to date to address squeezeouts and freeze-outs in LLCs. What little exists has focused on after-thefact litigation-oriented remedies: what fiduciary duty should members of an

• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Jeffrey Carra provided
valuable research assistance for this Article.
I am pleased to write in a symposium dedicated to the late F. Hodge O'Neal. While he was serving
as a distinguished visiting professor at McGeorge, Hodge generously gave his time to review portions
of my book on business planning and made many helpful suggestions.
I. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax
purposes).
2. Only Hawaii, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Vermont lack such statutes at the time this is
written.
3. For a detailed discussion of why this combination is desirable, see FRANKLIN A. GEYURTZ,
BUSINESS PLANNING 48-98 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
4. F. HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); F. HoDGE O 'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O ' NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985).
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LLC owe to each other, and what remedies should exist for oppressive
conduct?5 Fiduciary duty litigation and the like, however, is the last refuge
of failed planning-either by the participants or by the legislature. This
Article, therefore, takes a different approach. It focuses on the planning, or
perhaps the lack thereof, in the LLC statutes to prevent these problems. The
question it addresses is this: structurally, to what extent do provisions in the
LLC statutes facilitate or frustrate squeeze-outs and freeze-outs? 6
Part II of this Article will consider squeeze-outs, and Part III will look
at freeze-outs. While the terms are often used interchangeably, "squeezeout" as used in this Article refers to the situation where majority owners in
a business cut off the minority from any say in management, and, far more
importantly, from any significant distribution of the business' earnings.
"Freeze-out" refers to the situation in which the majority uses legal
compulsion (a sort of business eminent domain) to force an unwilling
minority to sell out its interest. The discussion in each Part will proceed
along similar lines. First, we will consider what provisions in corporate and
partnership law have promoted or inhibited squeeze-outs or freeze-outs,
respectively. Next, we will examine to what extent such provisions are, and
to what extent such provisions should be, in the LLC statutes. Part IV will
conclude this Article with several specific suggestions that will aid drafters
of LLC legislation in minimizing squeeze-out and freeze-out problems.
II.

A.

SQUEEZE-OUTS

The Danger of Squeeze-Outs in the Corporate Form

One of the primary dangers facing the minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation is that he or she will end up as the victim of what is often
referred to as a squeeze-out. In a squeeze-out, the majority shareholders use
their control to deprive the minority of any managerial control over, and,
of more practical significance, any economic return from, the corporation.
The classic case of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 7 provides a
5. See. e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited
Liability Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43 (1994); Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct
Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 21
(1994); S. Mark Curwin, Note, Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Sufficient
Protection of Member Interests?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989 (1993).
6. This Article leaves for another day the question of what planning participants in an LLC can
do for themselves to prevent these phenomena.
7. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
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typical example.
In Wilkes, four individuals set up a corporation to operate a nursing
home. They became equal shareholders, elected themselves directors, and
divided responsibilities for running the business among themselves. The
corporation declared no dividends, but paid equal amounts to the owners
as compensation for work performed. 8 Years after the corporation's
founding, a falling out occurred between its owners. As a result, three
owners voted the fourth, Wilkes, off the board and, acting as directors, cut
off his compensation.9 Without judicial relief, Wilkes' investment would
have been virtually worthless.
It requires no further citation than to Professor O'Neal's seminal work 10
to recognize that this pattern has repeated itself countless times among the
owners of closely held corporations. While the causes of dissension vary, 11
the pattern of the resulting squeeze-out is remarkably uniform: The
minority shareholder loses his or her employment with the corporation, 12
and the majority votes him or her off the board. The board votes to declare
little or no dividends, while the majority continues to receive money from
the corporation through salaries and perquisites. 13 Ultimately, the minority
shareholder may sell out at a bargain price to the majority.
As in Wilkes, a squeeze-out often ends up in litigation. The minority
shareholder generally has two available claims. 14 The first-that involved
in Wilkes-is for breach of fiduciary duty. Traditionally, this claim required
the complaining shareholder to convince the court that the majority's
actions, particularly in their role as directors, fall outside the protections
normally accorded by the so-called business judgment rule. 15 This is a
difficult row to hoe. The actions that most directly impact the minority
shareholder-his or her termination and the failure to declare divi-

8. ld. at 659-70.
9. ld. at 660-61.
10. See supra note 4.
II. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, §§ 2:01-:20 (reviewing various causes of squeezeouts).
12. Often, the loss of employment is a cause rather than a consequence of the squeeze-out (as, for
example, when a shareholder-employee retires). ld. § 2:03.
13. Tax considerations prompt owners of closely held C corporations to channel distributions into
the form of salaries (which can generate a deduction for the corporation) rather than dividends (which
are not deductible). See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 360.
14. This assumes no breach of a shareholders agreement designed to prevent squeeze-outs.
15. E.g., Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 580 (Me. 1975). For a critical
discussion of the business judgment rule, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287 (1994).
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dends--do not involve a conflict of interest transaction between the
majority owners and the corporation. Hence, under the traditional rule,
courts would apply a highly deferential level of review; for example, they
might require the complaining shareholder to prove the board's decision
was in bad faith or irrational. 16 Of course, the majority owners' receipt of
salaries and perquisites involves a conflict of interest and, hence, the
majority bears the burden of proving what they received was fair. 17 Still,
courts find a substantial range of compensation to be fair 18 and, at best,
such a challenge will give the squeezed-out shareholder only limited
leverage in obtaining some benefit from the corporation.
Wilkes applied an expanded concept of fiduciary duty based upon the
notion that shareholders in a closely held corporation owe each other a
fiduciary duty akin to that owed between partners. 19 In the context of a
squeeze-out, this duty requires the majority to show both a corporate
purpose for actions detrimental to the minority and that they could not
achieve this purpose in a less onerous manner.20 Not all jurisdictions,
however, subscribe to this notion of an expanded duty between shareholders
in a closely held corporation. Indeed, only just recently, the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected such a duty in Nixon v. Blackwe/1. 21
The alternate claim the minority shareholder may pursue is to seek an
involuntary dissolution pursuant to statutes allowing for such upon a
showing of oppression or the like.22 Not all jurisdictions, however, have
such provisions in their corporation laws.23 Those having such provisions
vary in terms of the precise requirements the plaintiff must show in order
to obtain relief. Some apply a "reasonable expectations" test which
questions whether the majority's actions are contrary to the expectations the
minority had when originally entering the venture, whether the majority
knew of those expectations at the inception, and whether the actions were
16. E.g., Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d. 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
17. E.g., Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). But see Miller v. Magline, Inc.,
256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (shifting the burden of proof back to the plaintiff after a limited
showing by the defendant majority).
18. See. e.g., Cookies Food Products, Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447
(Iowa 1988); Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983).
19. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-63 (Mass. 1976).
20. /d. at 663.
21. 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993).
22. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1800 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 1104-a (McKinney
1986 & Supp. 1995).
23. Delaware, for example, has no such provision.
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the plaintiffs fault. 24 Other jurisdictions view oppression in terms of
conduct that is wrongful or in bad faith, 25 suggesting perhaps a less
contractual and more subjective and fault-oriented approach.
Of course, if the remedy of dissolution resulted in the actual destruction
of a viable business, it might be analogous to cutting a baby in half if one
cannot determine the real mother. Much like Solomon's judgment,
however, the threat of dissolution normally produces a less drastic outcome.
Typically, the parties agree upon a buyout of the complaining shareholder's
interest, but presumably at a better price than what the minority would have
received without the leverage of dissolution. 26 Some statutes have short
circuited this process by simply allowing the court to order a buyout
instead of dissolution. 27
In any event, attacking squeeze-outs through litigation under these
theories is not the most desirable solution for minority shareholders. The
viability of these theories is limited in some jurisdictions; their application,
even where recognized, requires the court to accept the plaintiffs version
of what are often highly contested issues of fact; 28 and, under the best of
circumstances, pursuing these approaches embroils the plaintiff in costly
litigation. Accordingly, minority shareholders often attempt to protect
themselves through agreements intended to limit the majority's ability to
squeeze them out.29 Naturally, the need to draft such agreements adds to
the transaction costs of forming a closely held corporation, and worse, this
need is not always recognized by less-sophisticated parties.
In sum, corporate law norms are conducive to minority squeeze-outs in
a closely held firm. This, in turn, leads to costly litigation or the need to
engage in efforts to draft around the statutory norms. This is not an ideal
situation. Is there a better model that limited liability company statutes can
follow?

B.

The Partnership Contrast Case

In contrast to the plethora of reported decisions involving squeeze-outs
in closely held corporations, few cases involve such a phenomenon in
24. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179-80 (N.Y. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 392-93 (Or. 1973).
26. See, e.g., J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. I, 30-34 (1977)
(finding a buyout the most prevalent outcome of threatened dissolution).
27. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE§ 2000 (West 1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1118 (Supp. 1995).
28. See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977).
29. For discussion of such agreements, see GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 386-415.
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partnerships. Only rarely does one find litigation in which a partner
complains about his or her exclusion from management decisions,30 and
rarer still are complaints that a partner has been cut off from the firm's
eamings. 31 Why should this be so? There are several possible reasons.
Most writers ascribe the lack of squeeze-outs in partnerships to the more
ready availability of dissolution or a buyout for dissatisfied participants in
this form. 32 Barring other agreement, each partner in an ordinary partnership has the right to dissolve the firm at any time and demand liquidation
of the business. 33 As with involuntary dissolution of a corporation, if
dissolution of a partnership led to the destruction of a viable business, it
would hardly seem the recommended solution. As with corporate
dissolutions, however, it is a mistake to assume that partnership dissolution
has the same effect on the partnership business as did pouring water on the
"Wicked Witch of the West." Instead, if the business is viable, the
participants who wish to continue it can do so either by purchasing the
business in a liquidation sale or, more commonly, by buying the interest of
the departing partner.34
Of course, partners can, and often do, contract around the norm of
liquidation at will. Specifically, they can agree to a term, to an expulsion
clause, or explicitly to a buyout in lieu of liquidation, or to some
combination of the three. In fact, all three of these options essentially
substitute a buyout of the departing partner's interest for a liquidation sale
of the business. 35 The differences lie in the events which trigger the
buyout-wrongful departure prior to expiration of the term, expulsion
pursuant to the agreement, or whatever dissolution events the buy-sell
contract lists-the price of the buyout and the terms of the buyout.
The price and terms provided by the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) for

30. The cases that do exist fall into two camps. Some involve blatantly illegal attempts to exclude
a partner from participating in management. E.g., Hankin v. Hankin, 420 A.2d 1090 (Pa. 1980). In other
cases, the partnership agreement allowed for exclusion. E.g., McCallum v. Asbury, 393 P.2d 774 (Or.
1964) (en bane).
31. Drashner v. Sorenson, 63 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954), comes about as close as one can get to
finding this sort of complaint in a case dealing with an ordinary partnership. More recently, this sort
of problem has arisen in a few cases involving limited partnerships. E.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d
304 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989); Brooke v. Mt. Hood Meadows Oregon, Ltd., 725 P.2d 925 (Or. Ct. App.
1986).
32. See, e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 26, at 3; see also O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 4, § 2:15 (contrasting the difficulty of selling a minority interest in a close corporation).
33. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 31(l)(b), 38(1) (1914) [hereinafter UPA).
34. GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 185-87.
35. See UPA § 38 (1914).
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buying out a partner wrongfully departing prior to the end of a term are
particularly harsh for the departing partner. The UPA price excludes the
value of any goodwill of the business and is net of any damages caused by
wrongful departure.36 The continuing partners can also delay payment
until expiration of the term by posting a bond. 37 As a result, partnership
agreements providing for a term, without more seller-friendly price and
payment provisions, seriously undercut-although they do not completely
eliminate--the traditional easy exit advantage of partnerships versus closely
held corporations. It is therefore not surprising that one of the few
partnership cases involving a squabble over distribution of earnings,
Drashner v. Sorenson, 38 concerned a partnership for a term.
In Drashner, the plaintiff, in response to the partnership's failure to
distribute earnings on which he depended, sued to dissolve the partnership
prior to expiration of its term. His partners used this as grounds to invoke
the harsh buyout terms the UPA imposes upon a wrongfully dissolving
partner. 39 To avoid this outcome, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled
to judicial dissolution under section 32 of the UPA. This section-somewhat akin to the corporate statutory provisions allowing
dissolution for deadlock, oppression and the like--allows the court to
dissolve a partnership where a partner's persistent breach of the partnership
agreement or other conduct renders continuation of the partnership
impractical, or, in any event, if the court finds dissolution equitable.40 In
the end, based upon the trial court's resolution of heavily contested facts,
the plaintiff in Drashner lost;41 a lesson perhaps for those who decide that
obtaining a reasonable price upon a business divorce should depend upon
a judicial resolution of fault.
The limited partnership scheme is somewhat different. A general
partner's departure triggers dissolution and liquidation barring other
agreement or consent of the partners.42 A limited partner's departure,

36. UPA § 38(2)(c)(II) (1914). The Revised Unifonn Partnership Act (RUPA), however, would
include the value of goodwill even in the case of wrongful dissolution. REVISED UN!F. PARTNERSH!P
ACT § 70l(b) (1993) [hereinafter RUPA].
37. UPA § 38(2)(b) (1914). The RUPA, however, calls for payment before expiration of the tenn
if this will not cause undue hardship to the continuing partnership. RUPA § 70l(h) (1993).
38. 63 N.W.2d 255 (S.D. 1954).
39. /d. at 258-59. They also claimed that the plaintiff was neglecting his partnership duties. /d.
40. UPA § 32 (1914).
41. Drashner, 63 N .W.2d at 261.
42. REVISED UN!F. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 801(4) (1985) [hereinafter RULPA].

504

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 73 :497

however, does not. 43 In lieu of liquidation rights, the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) gives general partners the right to get
the fair value of their interest when their departure does not result in
dissolution and gives limited partners the right to withdraw and cash out at
fair value upon six months' notice.44 (This, of course, is subject to other
agreement, which might provide departing partners more or less favorable
price and terms. 45) Hence, while liquidation rights may not be as readily
available in limited partnerships, partners still have the ability to cash out
at a presumably fair value.
All told, the partner's ability to demand liquidation or a buyout prevents
a squeeze-out from rendering a minority partnership interest worthless. Yet,
easier exit may not be the only reason squeeze-outs appear to be less of a
problem in the partnership setting than in the close corporation context.
One must also consider the operating rules. In the corporate scheme,
ultimate management power normally resides in a board of directors elected
by a plurality of the shares voted.46 Hence, a majority can exclude the
minority from any involvement in decisionmaking.47 By contrast, barring
contrary agreement, all partners (and all general partners in a limited
partnership48) have equal rights to be involved in management.49
Of course, of more practical impact is the question of whether the
majority can cut off the minority's economic return from the business. In
the corporate context, the majority of the board generally has the power to
decide whether to distribute dividends,50 who shall be the officers or even
employees of the corporation,51 and what compensation officers and
employees shall receive.52 It is this power which provides the ammunition
for a squeeze-out. What about partnerships?
Interestingly enough, the UPA is silent regarding a partner's right to
demand immediate distribution of the firm's earnings. Presumably, the issue
then becomes whether the decision to retain rather than distribute earnings
43. See id. § 801.
44. /d. §§ 603, 604.
45. /d. § 603.
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 216 (1991).
47. This assumes the minority does not have the right to use cumulative voting and the parties
have employed no other prearranged devices to prevent squeeze-outs from management.
48. See RULPA § 403(a) (1985).
49. UPA § 18(e) (1914).
50. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
51. This assumes that the corporation's articles or bylaws do not call for election of officers by
the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (1991).
52. See, e.g., id. § 141(h).
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is one concerning an ordinary matter-making it subject to maJonty
rule53-and, if not, whether the failure to reach unanimity on the question
results in requiring distribution or requiring retention. Section 601 of the
RULPA makes the partnership agreement control the timing of
prewithdrawal distributions from a limited partnership-leaving the
question of what happens if the agreement is silent on the subject.
Curiously, and in contrast to the ample number of decisions addressing the
discretion available to a corporation's directors to refrain from declaring
dividends,54 there appears to be little judicial authority on these questions
in the partnership or limited partnership context. 55 Perhaps, in some
instances, this is because drafters of partnership agreements have responded
to the void by specifying rules regarding distributions. Yet, given the
informal nature of many partnerships, this could not be the only reason for
the lack of litigation over these issues. Perhaps, as suggested earlier, easy
exit from the partnership, or the threat thereof, preempts any litigation over
distributions.56 Still, there is one other important factor to consider.
Section 18(f) of the UPA precludes partners from receiving salaries from
the firm without agreement of all the partners (with a narrow exception for
a surviving partner who winds up the partnership).51 At first glance, this
prohibition-especially when contrasted with section 18(c) (which provides
for interest on a partner's loans)58-might strike one as reflecting a
strange antipathy toward the value of labor. Yet, when viewed in the
context of the squeeze-out problem, section 18(f) may deserve more
appreciation than it sometimes gets. If a majority in the corporation pursues
a starvation dividend policy, all other factors being equal, this will hurt the
53. See UPA § 18(h) (1914) (mandating that differences as to ordinary matters are decided by
majority).
54. See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.
2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975); Gottfried
v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
55. In dealing with a limited partnership, one court has held that the general partner has the same
discretion in making distributions as the directors of a corporation. Brooke v. Mt. Hood Meadows
Oregon, Ltd., 725 P.2d 925, 929 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
56. This is especially the case under the traditional common law rule barring suits between
partners except as part of an accounting following dissolution. See, e.g., Lewis v. Firestone, 338 P.2d
953 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
57. UPA § 18(f) (1914). The RUPA slightly expands this exception to include remuneration for
a winding up in any circumstance. RUPA § 40l(h) (1993). The prohibition against receiving
remuneration without the unanimous consent of participants covers limited partnerships. See RULPA
§§ 403, 1105 (1985) (applying general partnership rules in absence of explicit reference).
58. UPA § 18(c) (1914).
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majority more than the minority. Yet, the majority may offset this result
through its ability to obtain distributions from the corporation in other
ways-primarily through salaries. 59 By taking away this ability from
majorities in partnerships, section 18(£) creates a powerful impediment to
squeeze-outs.
C.

Whither Limited Liability Companies?
1. Operating Rules

The LLC statutes typically provide, barring other agreement, for
management by all members60-much as under the partnership law
scheme. While the normal LLC default rule, unlike the UPA, calls for
voting in proportion to profits or capital interest,61 this scheme does not
59. Other distribution techniques include payment on shareholder loans, repurchase of stock and
sale or lease of property from the shareholders to the corporation. GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 289-325,
354-68, 604. For reasons that may be psychological as much as anything else, see text accompanying
infra note 78, these other distributional techniques appear not to have caused as many problems with
squeeze-outs as have salaries.
60. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-22(a}(J994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.110 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 29-681 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17150 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 21 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.422 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-304 (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-621 (1994); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/15-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-4-l(a) (Bums
Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.702(1) (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-76 12 (Supp.
1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 33 (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:13 11 (West
Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 651(1) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS § 4A-402 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.4401 (West Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.079(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-401(1) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 212615 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.291 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(11)
(Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-15(A)
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 401 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-3-20(a)(Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT.§ 63.130 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-14 (1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-16 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-125 (1994); VA. CODE
ANN.§ 13.1-1022A (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 401(1) (West); W.VA. CODE
§ 31-IA-18(a)(Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0401(1)(West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15116 (Supp. 1994). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring use of
managers); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-32-69 (Supp. 1993) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 20 15 (West
Supp. 1995) (providing for the use of managers unless otherwise provided); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48238-101 (Supp. 1994) (containing no default for member or management control); TEX. REv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1995)(providing for the use of managers unless otherwise
provided).
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 10-12-28 (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17103(a)(l) (West Supp. 1995);
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-503 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 23
(West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.422 (West Supp. 1994);
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seem to increase the danger of squeeze-outs for minority interests (albeit,
it may somewhat increase the incidence of there being a voting minority in
a two-person firm) ..Hence, in most jurisdictions, the LLC scheme should
avoid the incidence of the unanticipated exclusion of some owners from
management that can occur in the corporate setting.62 (Of course, the
LLC's operating agreement or articles may call for managers rather than
members to run the firm. 63 The whole purpose of doing this, however, is
to exclude some members from management. 64 Hence, in this case, all the
owners should be on notice of their possible exclusion from a role in

IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.701 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-403(1)
{1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.4502 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 3228.356 (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.079(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp.
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-17(A) (Michie Supp.
1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 402 (McKinney Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2020
(West Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-21 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-16 {Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022B (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 302 (West);
W.VA. CODE§ 31-IA-18(b) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0404(1)(a) (West Supp. 1994);
WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1994). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993)(per capita);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1318(A) (West Supp. 1994) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 653
(West Supp. 1994) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:24 (Supp. 1994) (same); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 63.150(2) (Supp. 1994) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-224-101 (Supp. 1994) (same).
62. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2:10 (arguing that one cause of squeeze-outs in
closely held corporations is the parties' failure to recognize that in corporations, unlike partnerships,
majorities can exclude minorities from participating in management).
63. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-22(b) (1994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.110(b) {Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 29-681(b)(Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CoRP.
CODE§ 17151 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 21(d) (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-304 {1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-621(2)
(1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/15-1 {Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-4l(b) (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.705 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 177612 (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 33 (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1312 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 , § 651(3) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-402(a)(l) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4402 {West Supp.
1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.079(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-402(2) (1993);
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-2615 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 86.291 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 304-C:31(1) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-15(B) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW ch. 576, § 408 (McKinney Supp. 1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-3-24 (Supp. 1993); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.135 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-16-15 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-16 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-125
(1994); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1024 (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 401(2) (West);
W.VA. CODE§ 31-lA-20 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.D401(2) (West Supp. 1994); WYO.
STAT.§ 17-15-116 (Supp. 1994).
64. If all owners plan to participate in management, it would make little sense to provide for
managers, because such a provision could make it more difficult to qualify for partnership tax treatment.
See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229; Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
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governance.)
While the LLC statutes almost invariably establish limits on distributions
for the protection of creditors,65 they are less uniform on the question
whether the majority has the power to deprive the minority of
prewithdrawal distributions-at least in the absence of prior specific
agreement on the subject. Some of the most prominent jurisdictions, such
as Califomia, 66 Delaware,67 and New York, 68 follow the RULPA approach and make the timing and extent of distributions subject to the
operating agreement-ignoring the question of what rights exist if there is
no agreement on this issue. 69 Other acts fail even to address the timing
and extent, as opposed to perhaps the allocation,70 of distributions.

65. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-29(c) (1994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.305 (Supp. 1994) (effective July I,
1995); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-706 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-905 (Michie Supp.
1993); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17254 (West Supp. 1995); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-80-606 (West Supp.
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.427 (West Supp. 1994);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-407 (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-646 (1994); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para.
180/25-25 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-5-6 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 490A.807 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7616 (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat.
& R. Serv. ch. 275, § 45 (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1327 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 675 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-503 (1993);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.4808 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.54 (West Supp.
1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.109 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-604 (Supp. 1994);
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-2625 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 86-331 (Supp. 1993); N .H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:44 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:28-42 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-26 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 508 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT.§ 57C-4-06 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-32-64 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2030 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.§ 63.229 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7- 16-31 (1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-23 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-236-105 (1994); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 5.09 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-132 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13. 1-1035 (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 605 (West); W. VA.
CODE§ 31 - IA-29 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0607 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15120(a) (Supp. 1994).
66. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17251 (West Supp. 1995).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-601 (Supp. 1994).
68. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 507 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
69. Also following this approach are COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-601 (West Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.804 (West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2026 (West Supp.
1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.200 (Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4304 (West Supp.
1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:40 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-36 (West Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-28 (1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 5.04 (West Supp.
1995); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1031 (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 601 (West);
W.VA. CODE.§ 31-IA-26 (Supp. 1994).
70. Most LLC statutes have a provision governing the allocation of interim distributions barring
other agreement. ALA. CODE § I 0-12-29 ( 1994) (proportional); ALASKA STAT. § I 0.50.300 (Supp. 1994)
(equal); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 29-703(B)(I) (Supp. 1994) (proportional); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32601 (Michie Supp. 1993) (equal); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17250 (West Supp. 1995) (proportional); CoLO.
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Interestingly, the proposed Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(ULLCA) reflects a clearer, if perhaps impractical, approach, by prohibiting
interim distributions unless provided for in the operating agreement. 71
Many acts, however, provide for majority rule on this issue in the absence
of other agreement. 72 This, of course, provides the potential for a squeezeout. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fault such statutes. As discussed
earlier, 73 it is arguable that the majority has this power even in the
partnership context. Moreover, given the numerous variables involved in
deciding whether to distribute or reinvest a firm's earnings, it seems

REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-504 (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. ch. 267, § 29
(West) (proportional); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-504 (Supp. 1994) (proportional); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.426(1) (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-404 (1994) (equal); IDAHO
CODE§ 53-629 (1994) (equal); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/20-15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994)
(proportional); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-5-4 (Bums Supp. 1994) (proportional); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.803 (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7615(b) (Supp. 1993) (equal);
1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 42 (Baldwin) (equal); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12: 1324(B)
(West Supp. 1994) (equal); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 671 (West Supp. 1994) (equal); Mo. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-505(2) (1993) (proportional); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4303
(West 1994) (proportional); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.50 (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 347.101(2)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (proportional); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-601 (1993)
(equal); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2618 (Supp. 1994) (proportional); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86-341 (Supp.
1993) (proportional); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:39 (Supp. 1994) (proportional); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-35 (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-23 (Michie Supp. 1993)
(proportional); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 504 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (proportional); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 57C-4-04 (Supp. 1993) (proportional); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-60 (Supp. 1993)
(proportional); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2025(2) (West Supp. 1995) (proportional); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 63.195 (Supp. 1994) (proportional); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-27 (1992) (proportional); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 47-34-22 (Supp. 1994) (proportional); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-236-101 (Supp. 1994)
(equal); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 5.03 (West Supp. 1995) (proportional); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-129 (1994) (proportional); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 13. 1-1030 (Michie 1993) (proportional);
1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 504 (West) (proportional); W. VA. CODE § 31- 1A-25 (Supp. 1994)
(proportional); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0602 (West Supp. 1994) (proportional); Wvo. STAT.§ 17-15119 (Supp. 1994) (proportional). These will preclude any squeeze-out by the majority simply giving
itself distributions while depriving the minority of such.
71. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 406(b) (1995) (hereinafter ULLCA]; see also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-236-101 (Supp. 1994) (following the same approach).
72. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.330 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-703(A) (Supp.
1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-601 (Michie Supp. 1993); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 29
(West); IDAHO CODE§ 53-629 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/25-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-5-4 (Bums Supp. 1994); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 42
(Baldwin); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 671 (West Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 347.101(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-601 (1993); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0601 (West Supp.
1993); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.51 (West Supp. 1995) (board decides); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-4-04 (Supp. 1993) (managers decide); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-61 (Supp. 1993) (board
decides).
73. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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virtually impossible to construct a reasonable statutory formula for when
and how much of earnings every firm should pay out. Accordingly, the
prevention of squeeze-outs in LLCs must come from other provisions.
As the earlier discussion suggests, perhaps the most important operating
rule to prevent squeeze-outs in partnerships is the general preclusion of
salaries without agreement of all partners. The LLC statutes have gone off
in different directions on this point. California74 and the ULLCA75 follow
the partnership law scheme by denying salaries barring other agreement.
While some statutes expressly empower managers to vote themselves
salaries, 76 the vast bulk of the acts are silent, thereby leaving the issue
open to inevitable litigation. 77
As a prescriptive matter, it appears California and the proposed uniform
act have it right. Allowing the majority to set salaries provides critical
ammunition for squeeze-outs. More importantly, it plays into a central
psychological factor motivating the phenomenon-the common belief of
those running the business that the profits are almost entirely the result of
their efforts and not of the investments of the passive owners who, needless
to say, see things differently.78 This conflict between active and passive
owners pervades much of the squeeze-out phenomenon. 79 If parties at the
venture's inception contemplate unequal roles-some active, some
passive-presumably they will take this into account from the outset, either
through their profit sharing scheme or through specific salary agreements.
The typical squeeze-out occurs after some ownership interests, which
started as active, become passive-perhaps, as in Wilkes, involuntarily at
the behest of the majority (whether or not justified), or often because of
changing life circumstances (retirement, inheritance of shares by those
unable or unwilling to participate, or the like).80 These cases, unless
anticipated at the outset, would seem to call for a renegotiation among the

74. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17004(b) (West Supp. 1995).
75. ULLCA § 403(d) (1995). The speed with which the states have enacted their own LLC statutes
has prevented the just-completed ULLCA from exerting the level of influence obtained by the uniform
partnership and limited partnership acts.
76. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3228.623 (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-239-105
(Supp. 1994) (with member approval).
77. Arguably, the absence of a prohibition makes salaries subject to the general majority rule
provisions of the statute. This argument becomes stronger if the "powers" section of the LLC act
mentions compensation. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 17-15-104(a)(ix) (Supp. 1994) (giving the LLC
the power to filt its managers' compensation).
78. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2:03.
79. ld.
80. ld.
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parties-possibly leading to a buyout of the passive owners. That is what
the partnership norm produces. The problem with the corporate norm is that
it allows the active majority to dictate terms without such renegotiation. 81
As the discussion so far makes clear, the rights of the members of an
LLC-including the rights to a role in management and to distributions or
other compensation-are generally subject to the operating agreement.
Could a majority undertake a squeeze-out by amending the operating
agreement to deprive the minority of valuable rights? In fact, amendments
to articles or bylaws have sometimes been a part of squeeze-outs in the
corporate context. 82 By contrast, unless the agreement itself allows for
alteration on less than universal consent, 83 partnership or limited partnership agreements cannot be altered except by unanimous vote. 84
Again, the LLC statutes vary on this question. Many, if not most, acts
require unanimity to amend the operating agreement, unless the parties have
otherwise agreed. 85 Numerous other acts, however, allow amendment on
a majority (or, under some statutes, two-thirds) vote.86 Still other acts fail

81. While the majority is subject to review for fairness when setting its own salaries, see supra
note 17 and accompanying text, this does not guarantee the same result as an arms-length negotiation
with the passive owners. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
In rebuttal, one might ask whether the partnership norm does not give the passive owners too much
power to veto salaries justified by changed circumstances. See Levy v. Levitt, 178 N.E. 758 (N.Y. 1931)
(providing an example of changed circumstances that created a sympathetic, but legally unsustainable,
claim for a salary). One might also note that partnerships have produced their fair share of litigation
over salary claims. See, e.g., Busick v. Stoetel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 736 (1968); Levy, 178 N.E. 758. The
mitigating factor is that the active owners are not without leverage in any renegotiation; rather they can
always withdraw or dissolve.
82. See, e.g., Blount v. Taft, 246 S.E.2d 763 (N.C. 1978).
83. See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975) (partnership agreement
allowed amendment by majority), aff'd sub nom. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
84. See VPA § 18 (h) (1914); RULPA § 1105 (1985).
85. ALA. CODE§ I0-12-24(b) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 29-68l(c)(J) (Supp. 1994); ARK.
CODE ANN.§ 4-32-403(b)(l) (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17103(a)(2)(C) (West Supp.
1995); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-308(b)(5)(1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-623(2)(a)(1994); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-18-4-3(c)(l) (Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.701(3) (West Supp. 1994); 1994 Ky.
Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 35(2)(a) (Baldwin); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 653(2)(A) (West
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-402(b)(2) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.079(3)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-403(2)(a) (1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:24(VIXa) (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-3-03(1) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1- 1023(8)(1) (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 302(2)(a) (West); W.VA. CODE
§ 31-IA-19(b)(2) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0404(2)(a) (West. Supp. 1994).
86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12: 1318(B)(6)(West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-17(B)(J)
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW§ 402(c)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 2020(B)(4) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.150(3)(c) (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN.
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to address the question-leaving for litigation the issue of whether the
statutes' general majority rule provisions trump the normal rule requiring
the consent of all parties in order to modify a contract. 87
The obvious problem with amendment by majority vote is that it enables
the majority to alter the fundamental division of power and profit in ways
the parties would never have agreed to allow. For example, the abuse is
evident if a party with fifty-one percent of the profits and voting power
could simply amend the agreement to increase his or her profit share to
ninety-nine percent (particularly if he or she made no added contributions).
To address this problem, New York's statute will not allow a bare majority,
barring other agreement, to remove a supermajority voting requirement in
the agreement. 88 Nor will the New York statute allow the majority to alter
agreed contributions, tax item allocations, or distributions over the
opposition of prejudiced members. 89 Such provisions, however, are largely
unique to New York. They also risk ambiguities and gaps. As an illustration, New York's statute only indirectly, if at all, prevents the alteration of
profit shares in the abusive manner described above. Since the New York
statute refers only to profit allocations for tax purposes,90 the prejudiced
minority member would need to argue that the act also prohibits changing
the allocation of economic profits because this would render any unchanged
allocation of profits for tax purposes of questionable validity under I.R.C.
section 704(b)' s "substantial economic effect" requirement. 91 Yet, what
about the majority voting itself generous salaries? This could certainly
upset the allocation of economic benefits from the firm. Nevertheless, it is
unclear if New York's law would prevent such an amendment.

LAWS§ 7-16-21(b)(5) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-206-102, 48-209-103(e) (Supp. 1994); TEX.
REV. C!V. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.23(0)(1) (West Supp. 1995); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.150(c)
(Supp. 1994) (two-thirds superrnajority); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 23(b) (West) (same);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b), (t) (Supp. 1994) (allowing amendment by majority vote
through merger); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:28-27 (West Supp. 1994) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 322.8.603, 605 (West Supp. 1994) (amendment by majority of board members); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 805, para. 180/5-20(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (two-thirds vote to amend articles, which can trump
operating agreement).
87. See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 634-36 (R.I. 1974).
88. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 402(e) (McKinney Supp. 1995); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5319-17(C) (Michie Supp. 1993) (similar protective provision).
89. N.Y. LTD. LJAB. Co. LAW § 417(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (requiring consent of each
affected member to implement the change).
90. /d. § 417(b)(ii)(B).
91. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1988). For an explanation of the substantial economic effect requirement, see
GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 151-52.
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This discussion suggests that a unanimous vote requirement (barring
other agreement) for amendment of the operating agreement is the better
approach. Moreover, it is the approach which poses less danger of unfair
surprise for the parties. Not only is it the rule for partnerships and limited
partnerships, but it corresponds with the general notion of a contract as not
something normally subject to unilateral alteration. By contrast, while
corporate articles and bylaws are typically subject to amendment by less
than universal consent, 92 these corporate documents provide more of a
general framework-commonly understood to be subject to change over
objections-than a contract in the traditional sense between the participants.
Indeed, in a corporation, the basic allocation of profits and power, to a
great extent, is embodied in the stock distribution-which itself is
commonly understood to be subject to change (as when the corporation
issues new shares) with less than universal concurrence.

2. Exit Rules
For the most part, the LLC statutes' exit rules follow the pattern of the
RULP A. As with the withdrawal of a general partner from a limited
partnership, 93 departure of a member from an LLC will trigger dissolution
under most LLC statutes unless otherwise agreed or all (or, under some
statutes, a majority) of the remaining members consent to continue the
company without dissolution.94 Avoiding dissolution and liquidation,

92. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 216, 242 (1991) (allowing a majority to amend, barring
other arrangement).
93. See RULPA § 801(4) (1985).
94. ALA. CODE § 10-12-37(3)(b) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.400(3)(A) (Supp. 1994); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 29-781(A)(3) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-901(c) (Michie Supp. 1993);
CAL CORP. CODE § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-801(1)(c) (West
Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(4)(Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.441(1)(c) (West
Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-602(4) (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-642(3)(a) (1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-1(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-9-1(3) (Bums
Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.I301(3) (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7622(a)(3)
(Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 57(3)(a) (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1334(3) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 701(3)(A) (West Supp. 1994); Mo.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-904 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.137.1(3)(Vernon Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN.§ 35-8-901(3) (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:SO(IV)(a) (Supp. 1994); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-48(d) (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-39(A)(2) (Michie Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-6-01(4) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037(A)(3) (West
Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-101(bX2) (Supp. 1994); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, art. 6.0l(B) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-137(3)(b) (1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1046(3) (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 801(4) (West); W.VA. CODE§ 31IA-35(3) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0901(4)(a) (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 93-267, § 42(3)(West)(majority consent); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.4801(d)(i)(West Supp.
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however, does not render a member's interest illiquid. Instead, the LLC
statutes generally follow the limited partnership model by allowing LLC
members, in the absence of contrary agreement, to withdraw and cash out
at any time or on thirty days', ninety days', or six months' notice
(depending on the statute). 95
1994) (same); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-2622(3) (Supp. 1994) (two-thirds supennajority); N.Y. LTD. LIAB.
Co. LAW § 70I(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (majority consent). But see MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.80(1)(5) (West Supp. 1995) (unanimous consent can avoid dissolution only if stated in the
articles of organization); Nev. REv. STAT.§ 86-491(1)(c) (Supp. 1993) (same); N.D. CENT. Cooe § 1032-109(1) (Supp. 1993) (same); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.621(4) (Supp. 1994) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN.§ 47-34-29(3)(Supp. 1994)(same); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-123(a)(iii)(Supp. 1994)(same); see also
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-39(d) (1992) (dissolution unless otherwise agreed).
95. The statutes allowing withdrawal at any time are: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 29-734 (1994);
1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 30 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/25-5 (SmithHurd Supp. 1994); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 43 (Baldwin); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.103(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0802 (West Supp. 1994).
Those allowing withdrawal on 30 days' notice are: ALA. CODE§ 10-12-36(d) (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.185(b) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-802(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-II-601(c) (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-641(3) (1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-6-6 (Bums Supp.
1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1325(A) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 692(3)
(West Supp. 1994); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 35-8-802(3) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:27(11I)
(Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-37(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211 ,
§ 304(3) (West).
The statutes allowing withdrawal on 90 days' notice are: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4509
(West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2036(c) (West Supp. 1995).
Those statutes allowing withdrawal on six months' notice are: CAL. CORP. Cooe § 17252(a)(J), (c)
(West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603, 18-604 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.427(1) (West Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.704 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7616(b)(3) (Supp. 1993); Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-605 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 21-2619(b) (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.331(2)(b) (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:28-38
(West Supp. 1994); N.Y. Lm. L!AB. Co. LAW§§ 509,606 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-5-06 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.205(l)(b) (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-34-23 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1032 (Michie 1993); W.VA. CODE§ 31-IA-27
(Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-120(b)(ii) (Supp. 1994). A couple of states, Minnesota and North
Dakota, have no cash-out right in their LLC acts.
The LLC statutes also vary with respect to what the withdrawing member will receive. ALA. Cooe
§ 10-12-30(c) (1994) (liquidation value); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.335(b) (Supp. 1994) (fair market
value); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-602 (Michie Supp. 1993) (fair market value); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-734-707(8) (Supp. 1994) (fair market value); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17252(c) (West Supp. 1995)
(fair market value); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 30 (West) (fair market value); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604 (Supp. 1994) (fair market value); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.427 (West Supp. 1994)
(balance of capital contribution); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-405 (1994) (fair market value); IDAHO CODE
§ 53-630 (1994) (fair market value); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/25-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994)
(fair market value); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-5-5 (Bums Supp. 1994) (fair market value); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 490A.805 (West Supp. 1994) (fair market value); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7616 (Supp. 1993)
(capital contribution); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 43 (Baldwin) (fair market value); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1325 (West Supp. 1994)(fair market value); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 672
(West Supp. 1994) (any distribution); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4305 (West Supp. 1994) (fair
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Tax ramifications have been the principal motivating factor behind the
typical LLC statute's choice of a limited partnership rather than a corporate
exit model. The drafters were trying to avoid the corporate characteristic of
continuity of existence in order to obtain taxation as a partnership.96 By
happy coincidence, however, picking up the cash-out right from the limited
partnership acts should make LLC members less susceptible to squeezeouts. This also renders the involuntary dissolution provisions in many of
the LLC statutes,97 whether modeled on UPA section 32 or on corpora-

market value); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.103 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (fair market value); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-602(2) (1993) (fair market value); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2619 (Supp. 1994) (capital contribution); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86-331 (Supp. 1993) (capital contribution); N .H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304C:41(1) (Supp. 1994) (fair market value); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-39 (West Supp. 1994) (fair market
value); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-24 (Michie Supp. 1993) (fair market value); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co.
LAW§ 509 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (fair market value); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2027 (West Supp.
1995) (fair market value); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.215(1)(b) (Supp. 1994) (fair market value); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-16-29 (1992) (fair market value); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-23 (Supp. 1994)
(member contribution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-216-101(6Xe) (Supp. 1994) (value as determined by
operating agreement); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 5.06 (West Supp. 1995) (fair market
value); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-132(2) (1994) (fair market value); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1033
(Michie 1993) (fair market value); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 602 (West) (fair market value);
WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0604 (West Supp. 1994) {fair market value); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-120 (Supp.
1994) (contribution). Providing for anything less than fair market value undercuts the protection these
provisions give against squeeze-outs.
96. In order to obtain taxation as a partnership, an LLC can have no more than two of the
following four corporate characteristics: (I) limited liability; (2) central management; (3) free
transferability of interests; and (4) continuity of life. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229. By
definition, an LLC's members have limited liability and, if run by managers rather than members, an
LLC likely has central management. ld; Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20. Hence, it is important to
avoid the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.
97. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-38 {1994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.405 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN.§ 29-785 {Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-902 {Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1735 1 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-802 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 43 {West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802(a) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.441(2) (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-643
(1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-18-9-2 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.I302 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7629 (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, §58 (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1335 (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 702(1) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-903 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.4802 (West Supp. 1994);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3228.833(1) (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.143(2) (Vernon Supp.
1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-2622 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 86.331(4) (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:SI (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-49 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-40 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB.
Co. LAW§ 702 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-02(5) (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE§ 10-32-119 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2038 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.661 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 {1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-30
(Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-902(a) (1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
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tions laws, relevant only when an operating agreement curbs the cash-out
right.
As a prescriptive matter, one might challenge the choice of the limited
partnership over the corporate exit model for LLCs. The put option for any
member on six months' or less notice creates a continuing liquidity danger
for a firm with limited access to ready cash. 98 Worse, a member might
choose opportunistically to exploit a lack of liquidity by threatening
withdrawal unless there is a renegotiation of terms.99 Such a tactic might
also be used to force a liquidation and allow a freeze-out of other
members. 100 While these concerns are not without some force, on
balance, easier exit remains the better default rule. To understand why, it
is useful to step back and consider a fundamental planning choice
confronting parties forming any business.
In any business, the parties must consider what happens when an owner
departs the venture, either through death, personal bankruptcy or simply the
desire to withdraw. There are, broadly speaking, two models one may
follow. One is a buyout model, under which the remaining members of the
firm must purchase the departing member's interest if they wish to continue
the venture following such departure. The other is a free transfer model,
under which departure does not impact the other owners' right to continue
the business, but rather the departing owner conveys his or her interest to
whoever he or she wishes (or can). In a closely held business, typical for
an LLC, 101 the owners generally prefer the buyout model. This is not only
because such owners normally want control over who will be their
associates in the venture, 102 but also because free transfer does not
provide a meaningful option when there are no outsiders interested in

art. 6.02 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48·2b·l42 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1·1047
(Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 802 (West); W. VA. CODE§ 31· 1A·36 (Supp.
1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0902 (West Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-120(c) (Supp. 1994).
98. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs,
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 289 (1986).
99. !d. at 287. Tax considerations do not require such a cash-out right. Avoiding the characteristic
of continuity of life requires the possibility of dissolution rather than individual withdrawal. Rev. Proc.
95·1 0, 1995·3 I.R.B. 20.
100. See infra text accompanying note 106.
101. Publicly traded firms cannot obtain partnership tax treatment, see I.R.C. § 7704 ( 1988), and
hence will probably continue to use the corporate form. Thus, most LLCs will be closely held.
102. For example, it is common for shareholders in a closely held corporation to limit the
transferability of their stock in order to keep out strangers. See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 421-22.
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buying into the closely held business. 103 Hence, the partnership or limited
partnership buyout model corresponds with the probable choice of more
owners of closely held businesses than does the corporate free-transfer
model. 104
At the other end of things, one might ask whether more of the LLC
statutes should have followed the UPA, rather than the RULPA, default
rule and given each member a liquidation, rather than just a cash-out, right
(barring other agreement). As an overall matter, the wisdom of this choice
leads one into the debate that occurred over whether the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act should include such a liquidation right. 105 Suffice it to
say for present purposes that none of the arguments in this debate
suggested there would be a significant difference in terms of squeeze-outs.
There may, however, be a difference in terms of freeze-out potential-a
subject to which we now tum.
III.

FREEZE-OUTS

Both partnership law and corporate law contain mechanisms through
which some owners can involuntarily remove--or "freeze out" to use the
pejorative term--others from the firm. These mechanisms have important
differences, however, which may affect their suitability for limited liability
companies.

A.

Freeze-Outs in Partnerships

The very ease of exit that serves to curb squeeze-outs in partnerships
provides the mechanism for some partners to freeze out others. In a
partnership at will, any partner (or group of partners) seeking to kick out
other partners might simply dissolve the firm and then attempt to acquire
the business in the ensuing liquidation sale.106 This tactic, however, is not
without difficulties. Some rights of the firm may be nonassignable or
terminate upon dissolution, 107 and the purchasi.11g partners may need to
line up new financing rather than simply assuming the partnership's debts.

103. See, e.g., O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2:15 ("Anything less than a controlling
interest in a close corporation does not have a ready market ....").
104. Tax considerations compound this conclusion for an LLC. Restricting free transfer may be
necessary in order to obtain partnership tax treatment. See supra note 96.
105. See, e.g., RUPA § 801 cmt. (1992 Draft).
106. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partnership Freeze-Outs, 40 MERCER L. REv. 535, 54041 (1989).
107. See, e.g., Fairway Dev. Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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of the business. The purchase of these tangible assets would not allow the
other partner(s) to continue the enterprise effectively, nor will their sale to
the partner causing dissolution produce anything close to the fair market
value of the business as a going concern. A vivid example of this type of
freeze-out is found in Cude v. Couch. 112 Cude and Couch were partners
operating a laundromat on premises which they rented from Couch on a
month-to-month basis. Couch dissolved the firm and announced that he
would no longer rent the premises to anyone else. Couch then purchased
the partnership's equipment at auction for a fraction of the price that he and
Cude originally spent to buy the laundromat as a going concern. He
continued to operate the business with his son. 113 Less vivid but more
common examples of this phenomenon occur upon the breakup of
professional firms, when the various partners scramble for the clients.
Unless the ensuing struggle produces a roughly proportional division of the
firm's business, there will be a freeze-out by those partners able to obtain
the bulk of the clientele and thereby essentially the business.114
A number of possible defenses exist against freeze-outs even in these two
situations. To begin with, one might challenge the dissolution and
liquidation of the business as involving a breach of a partner's duty of good
faith or fiduciary duty towards his or her fellow partner(s). 115 Such a
challenge involves difficult questions of defining good faith, as well as
difficult issues of proof, 116 and there is a serious split of authority on its
availability. 117 Alternatively, courts might refuse to allow any partner, in
the absence of agreement, to bid for the firm's assets in a liquidation
sale 118- although this seems a bit like Solomon's famous bluff. At the
112. 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979).
113. ld; see also Salter v. Condon, 236 Ill. App. 17 (1925). The defendant in Salter owned land
on which the partnership operated a golf course. /d. at 19. After dissolution, the defendant retained the
land and the golf course's goodwill which carne with the land. !d.
114. See, e.g., Smith v. Bull, 325 P.2d 463 (Cal. 1958) (detailing how defendant partners took
advertising agency's primary client following dissolution).
115. See. e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (dicta) ("A partner may not ... by use
of adverse pressure 'freeze out' a co-partner and appropriate the business to his own use.').
116. For a discussion of these problems, see Gevurtz, supra note I06, at 555-58.
117. Compare Page, 359 P.2d 41 (allowing such a challenge) and Howell v. Harvey, 5 Ark. 270
(1843) (same} with Salter, 236 Ill. App. at 25-26 (disallowing the challenge} and Johnson v. Kennedy,
214 N.E.2d 276 (Mass. 1966) (same). The RUPA further muddies the waters. Compare RUPA § 404{d)
(1993} (partners must exercise any rights in good faith} with RUPA § 602(b) (limiting the definition
of wrongful dissociation}.
liS. See, e.g., Rowell v. Rowell, 99 N.W. 473 (Wis. 1904} (voiding a transfer in which the sole
remaining partner obtained partnership property}. But see Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1973) (allowing partners to purchase partnership property in a liquidation sale}.
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least, a court could refuse to approve a sale to a partner at what the court
perceives to be an inadequate price. 119 Courts might decide to award the
business to the more deserving partner120 (however, not only does this
seem contrary to the UPA, 121 but experience suggests that this is as likely
to facilitate a freeze-out as to frustrate one 122) . To deal with the second
freeze-out scenario, courts might demand that partners pay for the goodwill
value they are effectively appropriating.123 This, however, often entails
the difficult effort of disentangling the value of individual and firm reputations. 124 From a planning standpoint, partners might seek to avoid freezeouts upon dissolution by agreeing to a partnership for a term. This,
however, can lead to the problem found in the Drashner case, discussed
earlier, 125 when the partners no longer get along. Perhaps a buy-sell
contract could help; although this adds to the transaction costs of forming
a partnership and may not be done by less sophisticated parties. 126 All
told, there may be no perfect solutions. 127 Fortunately, the two situations
outlined above (in which dissolution freeze-outs can pose a problem) do
not, judging by the quantity of reported litigation, appear to occur
often. 128
As explained earlier, partners often contract around the norm of
liquidation at will. In this event, is there a way for a majority of partners
to remove other partners involuntarily? The answer depends upon whether
the partnership agreement contains an expulsion clause. 129 If it does, then
119. See Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 407 N.E.2d 821, 832 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (approving
of certain precautions taken to obtain a fair price at a judicial sale).
120. See, e.g., Nicholes v. Hunt, 541 P.2d 820, 828 (Or. 1975).
121. UPA § 38(1) (1914) (directing that proceeds from dissolution be "applied to pay in cash the
net amount owing to the respective partners''); Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 280 N.W.2d 335 (Wis. 1979);
Young v. Cooper, 203 S .W.2d 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).
122. Rinke v. Rinke, 48 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1951), provides an example of a situation in which
a court's decision to distribute the partnership's assets in kind, rather than to order a sale of assets, may
have facilitated a freeze-out.
123. E.g., Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983).
124. See, e.g., In re Brown, ISO N.E. 581 (N.Y. 1926).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
126. For a discussion of partnership buy-sell contracts, see GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 188-233.
127. See generally Gevurtz, supra note 106. In this sense, I confess that the title Preventing
Partnership Freeze-Outs was perhaps misleading.
128. At least relative to the frequency of litigation involving corporate squeeze-outs.
129. One other way to expel partners from a partnership for a term is for some partners to convince
a court to order dissolution under UP A § 32 because of wrongful conduct by other partners and
thereupon to award the wronged partners the right to continue the business under § 38(2). See, e.g.,
Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). Expulsion clauses can also give partners the
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the majority can kick partners out in accordance with the terms of the
clause. 130 Agreements vary as to whether the majority may expel partners
for any reason 131 or whether the expulsion power is limited to specified
grounds. 132 In either event, the expelled partners are entitled to receive
the value of their interest in the partnership. 133 There is uncertainty in the
cases, however, about the extent to which the exercise of an expulsion
power is subject to a good faith limit; both in terms of whether such a limit
exists 134 and, if so, in terms of what sort of conduct it would take to
establish bad faith. 135 Overall, the critical point to note about the freezeout of partners pursuant to an expulsion clause is that this power only
exists when partners expressly agree to it. Hence, while partners may be
upset to find themselves expelled under such a clause, they generally
should not be unfairly surprised by the very possibility.

B. Freeze-Outs in Corporations
As just explained, unless partners expressly agree to give a majority the
right to expel members, the majority of partners have no power, simply by
virtue of being the majority, to freeze other partners out of the firm. True,
the majority (or even a minority) might dissolve a partnership which is at
will and attempt to acquire the business in the ensuing liquidation. But
majority status does not dictate who succeeds to the business in this event;
rather, the willingness and ability to pay more does. 136 Corporate law has
evolved in a different direction. Significantly, this evolution has not
occurred by virtue of provisions in the corporations statutes that have as
their explicit objective allowing majority shareholders to expel the
minority.137 Instead, majority shareholders have discovered ways to use
UPA § 38(1) (1914).
130. UPA §§ 3l(l)(d), 38(1) (1914).
131. See, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
132. See, e.g., Millet v. Slocum, 167 N.Y.S.2d 136, 140 (App. Div. 1957) (limiting the grounds to
"incompatibility").
133. UPA § 38(1) (1914).
134. See, e.g., Gill v. Mallory, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158 (App. Div. 1948) ("It does not appear that
defendants acted in bad faith [by expelling partners] (if that were to be the test) ... .').
135. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977) (framing good faith
as lacking any "undue penalty" or "unjust forfeiture").
136. Alternatively, in a professional firm, the ability to attract and retain clients dictates who
effectively takes over the business.
137. An exception is for freeze-outs of small minorities through the use of short-form mergers. See,
e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del. 1962) ("[T]he very purpose of the [short
fonn meraerl
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stockholders ends up entitled to more than a fraction of a share. 144 Then,
the corporation pays cash to the minority in lieu of issuing fractional shares
under statutory provisions allowing such an action. 145 The most popular
freeze-out technique, however, is through a cash-out merger. Coggins v.
New England Patriots Footba/J Club, Inc. 146 provides a good illustration.
Sullivan obtained ownership or control of all the voting shares of the
corporation which operated the New England Patriots football team. He
borrowed the funds for this acquisition and needed to use all the
corporation's earnings to pay off this loan. In order to prevent challenges
by holders of nonvoting shares, he cashed them out through a merger.
Specifically, he transferred his voting shares to a shell corporation set up
for the transaction in exchange for all the shell corporation's stock. He then
had the boards of both corporations (who he, of course, controlled) and the
shares of both corporations vote to approve a merger between the two
corporations in which all the nonvoting shares of the Patriots corporation
were cancelled and their owners received cash. 147
It is quite evident that these techniques involve the use of corporate law
provisions to accomplish an objective foreign to their purposes. The reverse
stock split depends upon the power of the majority to amend the articles148-not something which at first glance would seem to encompass
the power of expulsion-and the statutory ability to issue cash in lieu of
fractional shares. The purpose of allowing the company to cash out
fractional shares, however, is to avoid the inconvenience for both
corporation and shareholder of holding fractional shares when, as
inevitable, mergers and recapitalizations do not always involve one-to-one
exchange ratios. 149 Merger provisions, like those used in Coggins, allow
a convenient method for structuring acquisitions or combinations between
different businesses or the simplification of corporate structures. 150
Allowing cash or other nonequity consideration in a merger recognizes that
many acquisitions are for cash or debt rather than for stock in the buying

144. See, e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 1974).
145. See, e.g, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 155 (1991); N.Y. Bus . CoRP. LAW § 509(b) (McKinney
1986).
146. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986).
147. !d. at 1114- 15.
148. See, e.g., Lerner v. Lerner, 511 A.2d 501 (Md. 1986).
149. See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 804.
150. As, for example, when a subsidiary mergers with its parent corporation in order to allow
operation completely within one corporate entity.

524

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

73:497

firm. 151 The idea of using the merger provisions to allow the majority to
kick out the minority in a transaction in which the only combination is with
a short-lived shell corporation set up solely for the merger, however, is not
something that appears contemplated on the face of the merger statutes.
Nevertheless, and in contrast to the earlier dissolution cases, courts
generally have rejected arguments that reverse stock split or merger freezeouts simply are not authorized by the corporation laws. 152
Given this result, the only option left to expelled minority shareholders153 is to challenge the specific freeze-out maneuver as a breach of the
majority's fiduciary duty. Such an attack raises several issues. To begin
with, state corporations statutes typically provide a right of appraisal for
stockholders dissenting from a merger. 154 Do these statutes establish an
exclusive remedy? If so, the minority stockholders may be able to demand
that the corporation pay them more, and pay them cash (rather than debt
instruments, for example). Minority stockholders, however, will not be able
to halt their forced removal on the ground that it constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. Both the language of appraisal provisions and judicial
interpretations vary between the states. At one extreme lie opinions holding
that the appraisal provisions preclude almost any challenge to the
merger. 155 Short of this extreme lie a host of exceptions to exclusivity.ts6
Assuming the challenging stockholders get past the appraisal statutes, the
question becomes upon what grounds will the court upset the transaction.
Here, one confronts a basic division between those jurisdictions that require

151. See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 804-22.
152. See, e.g., Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952); Teschner, 322 N.E.2d 54. But
see Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Nov. 19, 1975).
153. This assumes no misrepresentation or omission that might set up a fraud claim. See, e.g., Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
154. CAL. CORP. CODE§§ 1300-1312 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262
(1991 & Supp. 1994).
155. See, e.g., YaMow v. Teal Indus. Inc., 422 A.2d 311,318-19 (Conn. 1979). Presumably, these
courts still would allow challenges for failure to comply with statutory requirements; for example,
insufficient votes cast in favor of the merger, or for misrepresentations in inducing the shareholder vote.
156. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986) (holding that appraisal is the
exclusive remedy except in a transaction with a controlling shareholder); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that, ordinarily, any monetary remedy should come from appraisal, but
appraisal may not be adequate in cases of fraud, self-dealing, waste or gross overreaching); Walter J.
Schloss Assoc. v. Arkwin Indus., Inc., 460 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the New York
appraisal statute bars an action unless it seeks primarily an equitable remedy rather than money
damages).
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allow dissolution (barring other agreement) with the consent of all
members. 168
All told, in most jurisdictions no members of an LLC can force
liquidation as long as at least two other members wish to continue the firm.
This, of course, precludes freeze-outs through dissolution and liquidation,
at least as long as the firm has the liquidity to buy out the withdrawing
members. On the other hand, it is difficult to criticize those statutes that
allow the majority (or even any member) to force liquidation barring other
agreement or provision in the articles. After all, if the parties do not get
along, determining who gets the business through competitive bidding may
be at least as reasonable as a contest over who withdraws from the firm
last.
In any event, the liquidation of LLC assets after dissolution should be no
different from the practice with partnerships. 169 The LLC statutes certain-

(West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § S3-19-39(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. L1AB. Co.
LAW § 402(d)(l) {McKinney Supp. 1995) (two-thirds supennajority); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-32-111
(Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2l(b) (1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art.
2.23(D)(5) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-137(3)(b) (1994).
168. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-37(2) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.400(2) (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN.§ 29-781(A)(2) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-90l(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-801(b) (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(3) (1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN.§ 608.44l(l)(b) (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-602(3) (1994); IDAHO CODE
§ 53-642(2) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE
ANN.§ 23-18-9-1(2) (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.l301(2) (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
STAT. ANN.§ 17-7622(2) (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 57(2) (Baldwin);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-902(2) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 701(2) (West
Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.480l(c) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.137(2) {Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-901(2) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 212622(2) (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 86-491(1)(b) (Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304C:50(Ill) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-48(c) (West Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-601(3) {Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037(A)(2) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 63.621(3) (Supp. 1994); S.D. COOCFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-29(2) (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 245-IOI(b)(2)(Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1046(2)(Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv.
ch. 211, § 801(3) (West); W. VA. CODE§ 31-1A-35(2) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0901(2)
(West 1994); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-123(a)(ii) (1989). Two states' laws contain internal inconsistencies
on this issue: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.701(2)(a) (requiring majority vote), 490A.l301(2) (requiring
unanimous consent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2020(8)(1) (requiring majority vote), 2037(A)(2)
(requiring unanimous consent).
169. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-41 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.425 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-708 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-905 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 17352, 17353 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-805 (West Supp. 1994);
1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-262, § 46 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-803, 18-804 (1993
& Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.444 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11-605 (1994);
IDAHO CODE§ 53-646 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND.
CODE ANN.§ 23-18-9-6 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.J304 (West Supp. 1994); KAN.
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substantially all assets, requires a unanimous vote. 171 LLC statutes differ
on this requirement. A few follow the partnership law rule and require a
unanimous vote. 172 Many, however, explicitly allow a sale of substantially
all assets on less than unanimous vote. 173 Still others do not specifically
address the issue-which may leave the matter open to majority rule by
default. 174 One could easily debate whether a majority in an LLC should be
able to force the sale of a business to a third party over the objections of
the minority-a subject perhaps for another article. The fact that the
partnership norm is to the contrary at least raises a question as to what the
normal expectation of participants is in the sort of closely held venture
most likely to use the LLC form. Be this as it may, there seems little policy
reason to allow the majority to avoid the protection of a liquidation sale
open to bids from all when it is the majority (directly or indirectly) who is
the buyer. 175 On a broader level, whether asset sales should be a vehicle
for LLC freeze-outs raises the same prescriptive issues as would an effort

171. See UPA §§ 9(3) ( 1914)(requiring unanimity for certain major transactions), 18(h) (allowing
"differences arising as to ordinary matters" to be decided by a majority); RULPA §§ 403(a), 1105
( 1985) (giving general partners of a limited partnership the same powers as partners in an ordinary
partnership).
172. GA. CoDE ANN.§ 14-11-308(b)(3) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.079(3)(5) (Vernon Supp.
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-3-03 (Supp. 1993).
173. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.701(2)(b)(WestSupp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1318(8)(2)
(West Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4502(3) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.77 (West Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:24(V) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:28-27 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-17(8)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD.
LIAB. Co. LAW§ 402(d)(2)(McKinney Supp. 1995)(two-thirds supermajority); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1032-1 08( I )(Supp. 1993)(majority of board); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2020(B)(3)(West Supp. 1995);
OR. REv. STAT. § 63.150(3)(a) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-2l(b)(2) (1992); TEX. REv. Clv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.23(DX7) (West Supp. 1995); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 404
(West) (majority of managers); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-18(c) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.0404(l)(a) (West Supp. 1994).
174. See ALA. CODE§ 10-12-41 (1994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.150 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 29-681(0) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-403 {Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP.
CODE§ 17103(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-708 (West Supp. 1994); 1993
Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 23 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.4231 {West Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-623 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
para. 180/ 10-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-4-3 (Bums Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN.§ 17-7613 (Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 34 (Baldwin); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-403 (1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-403 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 86.291 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-16 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48206-101 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-125 (1994); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-1022 (Michie
1993); WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-116 (Supp. 1994).
175. But see Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corp., 189 A.2d 675 (Del. 1963) (allowing such a sale in the
corporate context).
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This requirement, of course, will prevent freeze-out mergers for LLCs
formed under the laws of those jurisdictions. Many others, however,
including such important jurisdictions as Delaware, 180 New York, 181 and
California, 182 call for majority (or at least less than unanimous) approval.l83
Still, if consideration in a merger must consist of an ownership interest
in the new LLC, then even a majority vote could not tum the key for a
freeze-out merger. 184 Yet, most of the jurisdictions that allow majority
approval of mergers also allow nonequity consideration. 185 Other acts are

(Michie 1993); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-140(a) (Supp. 1994).
180. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209 (1993).
181. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 1002(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (requiring two-thirds approval).
182. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1755l(a) (West Supp. 1995).
183. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-1202(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE§ 53-662(1) (1994);
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.701(2Xc) (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1318(B)(3) (West
Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 742 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.72(1)
(West Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:l9(I) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-20(b)
(West Supp. 1994); N .M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-17(B)(l) (Michie Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 2020(B)(3) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.150(3)(b) (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 716-2l(b)(3) (1992); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.23(D)(4) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-149(1) (1994); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 1102(1) (West); W.VA. CODE
§ 31-lA-42 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.1202 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv.
P.A. 93-267, § 65(a) (West) (two-thirds supermajority); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-244-J02(aX2) (Supp.
1994) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-102(1) (Supp. 1993) (same). Rhode Island has an internal
inconsistency in its statute on this issue. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-21 (b)(3) (requiring majority vote),
7-16-6l(a)(J) (requiring unanimous consent).
184. An exception could exist if the LLC had the option to redeem the new interest. Issuing a new
redeemable interest in the merger appears equivalent to, or would seem to require amending the
operating agreement to add, an expulsion clause--a subject for later discussion.
185. ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.505 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 29-752(D) (Supp. 1994);
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-32-120l(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE§ 1755J(a)(3) (West Supp.
1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-1003(l)(e) (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A.
93-267, § 66(b)(3) (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b) (1993); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-11·
902(b)(3) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-661(2) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-7-l(b) (Bums Supp.
1994); IOWA ConE ANN. § 490A.l202(2)(c) (West Supp. 1994); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch.
275, § 69(2) (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1358(BX3) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, § 741{2) (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4701(2)(b) (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 322B.71(1)(3)(i) (West Supp. 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C: 18(II)
(Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-20(b) (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW§ 1002(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-9-02(b)(3) (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-32JOJ(l)(c) (Supp. 1993); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.481(2)(c) (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-60(b)(3)
(1992); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 47-34-39(3) (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
art. 10.02(5) (West Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1 070(B)(4) (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis.
Serv. ch. 211, § 1101(2)(c) (West); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-4l(c) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.1201(3) (West Supp. 1994).
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silent or ambiguous, thereby inviting litigation. 186 At least one important
jurisdiction, California, recognizing that the combination of majority vote
and nonequity consideration allows for freeze-out mergers, limits the use
of such consideration (unless all members consent) when an LLC merges
with an entity owned by the majority of ownership in the LLC. 187
As a prescriptive matter, one must question the justification of those
jurisdictions whose statutes contain the necessary ingredients for freeze-out
mergers. Perhaps the drafters of these acts felt that the better gap-filling or
•"default" rule is for the majority (unless otherwise agreed) to have the
power to expel the minority from the finn. If so, this reflects a questionable
judgment.
In deciding upon a default rule, presumably one is attempting to codify
the approach that most parties who form an LLC, and who do not cover
this contingency in their own agreement, would have agreed to if they
thought about it in advance. 188 In determining what most parties in LLCs
would have agreed to, it is useful to start by noting a rather curious feature
in the approaches of partnership and corporate law to this question. Ask
yourself, in which form, partnership or corporation, would there appear to
be a greater need for majorities to be able to expel minorities? The answer
should be in partnerships, where each partner (barring other agreement) has
the right to participate in management 189 and, even worse, each partner
can create personal liability for his or her fellow partners. 190 By contrast,
the majority rule and passive shareholder norms inherent in corporate law
allow the majority essentially to ignore the minority. 191 Yet, the default
rules are the opposite of the result suggested by this logic. The majority of

186. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-54 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7650 (Supp. 1993); Mo. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & AsS'NS § 4A-701 to 710 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.127 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-1201 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-62(0) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing
receipt of property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. til 18, § 2054 (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-244101 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-149 (1994).
187. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 175Sl(b) (West Supp. 1995). California has ellceptions, however, if the
minority has less than a ten percent ownership or if the state's Corporations Commissioner approves
the fairness of the transaction. /d. § 407. These provisions track California's corporations statute. /d.
§§ 1101, I 101-1.
188. See. e.g., CHARLES R. O'I<ELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 48 (1992). But see Ian Ayres & Roben Gertner,
Filling Gaps in lnccmplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
(arguing that legislatures should sometimes set "penalty defaults" that would induce parties to bargain,
rather than relying on the legislature).
189. UPA § 18(e) (1914).
190. /d.§§ 9(1), 13, IS.
191. This was seen earlier in the discussion of squeeze-outs. See supra tell! acccmpanying notes
46-47.
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partners lack the power to expel others and take the ftrm without express
agreement; by contrast, courts have interpreted corporations statutes to
allow such expulsion by majority shareholders.
Perhaps this simply reflects a poor choice of default rules in the UPA.
If so, one would expect to ftnd that most partnership agreements contract
around the rule by including an expulsion clause. This is an interesting
empirical question which the drafters of LLC statutes could investigate.
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that expulsion clauses, while
common (especially in professional ftrms), are not clearly predominant. 192
This, in turn, may suggest that most owners in the sort of closely held
businesses likely to become LLCs will not expect the majority to have the
right to expel a minority.
At any event, even if majority expulsion is the better default rule, it
should be explicit in the statute rather than hidden in merger provisions.
There are a couple of reasons for this. The most obvious is to provide a
warning to parties, who, if they knew about the rule, would wish to
contract around it. In this regard, one might divide parties who will form
LLCs into three groups. There are unsophisticated parties who will form the
company without legal advice or much thought about contingencies like
freeze-outs. Obviously, for this group, clarity in the statute about the default
rule will not make any difference. On the other hand, given that formation
of an LLC requires compliance with statutory formalities 193-in contrast

192. See, e.g., Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43
TEx. L. REv. 631, 653 (1965) (stating expulsion clauses are "quite rare" in the author's experience).
193. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-12 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.070 (Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 29-634 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-201 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17050 (West Supp. 1995); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-205 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 93-267, § 14 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 (1993 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.4081 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-206 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-611
(1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/5-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-2-4
(Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.l20 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7605
(Supp. 1993); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 4 (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1304
{West Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 621 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS'NS § 4A-202 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4104 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN.§ 322B.l05 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 347.037 {Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE
ANN.§ 35-8-201 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-2605 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 86.151 (Supp.
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:2 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-ll (West Supp. 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 53-19-9 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LtAB. Co. LAW§ 203 (McKinney Supp.
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 57C-l-20 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 10-32-08 (Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2004 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT.§ 63.004 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-16-5 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-4 {Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-203-102
(Supp. 1994); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 3.01 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2b-103 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1003 (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211,
§ 201 (West); W.VA. CODE§ 31-lA-7 (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0108 (West Supp. 1994);
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to an ordinary partnership 194-this group is not likely to be that large. At
the other extreme, participants may have the assistance of highly sophisticated legal counsel. Such counsel should be aware of the potential use of
merger provisions to force minority owners out and could explore
alternatives in the operating agreement. The problem lies, however, with the
middle group; parties who seek assistance of counsel, but whose counsel
does not realize the hidden significance of merger provisions in the LLC
statute. Is this likely to be a large group? Given the fact that a review of
many of the articles to date discussing the LLC statutes, 195 as well as the
available treatise on the acts, 196 found no mention of the possibility of
freeze-out mergers, the answer must be yes. 197
A second problem with a hidden statutory expulsion rule is that it fails
to consider a variety of questions which an explicit rule normally would
cover. For example, what, if any, grounds must the majority have to expel
the minority? A well-drafted contract would address this. 198 The default
expulsion provisions in the RUPA do as well. 199 Small wonder that one
of the basic divisions of authority involving freeze-out mergers in corporate
law is whether there must be a corporate purpose for the transaction. 200
A more likely rationale for the merger provisions in the LLC statutes is
simply to facilitate the combination and sale of businesses; one suspects the
drafters probably never focused on mergers whose sole function is to
freeze-out a minority. Actually, one could question whether LLC merger
provisions are necessary or even appropriate for the goal of facilitating
business combinations and sales. Partners have bought, sold and combined
businesses for decades under the UPA without any statutory merger

WYO. STAT.§ 17-15-106 (Supp. 1994).
194. See UPA § 6(1) (1914).
195. E.g., Scott R . Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative for
Business, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 55 (1993); Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited
Liability Company, 41 CASE W . REs. L. REv. 387 (1991); Peter D. Hutcheon, The New Jersey Limited
Liability Company Statute: Background and Concepts, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. Ill (1993); James W .
Lovely, Agency Costs. Liquidity, and the Limited Liability Company as an Alternative to the Close
Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REv. 377 (1992); Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act,
73 OR. L. REv. I (1994); Ann Maxey, West Virginia's Limited Liability Company Act: Problems with
the Act, 96 W .VA. L. REv. 905 (1994); see also articles cited in supra note 5.
196. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERTR. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND I<.EATINGEON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES (1992).
197. At the risk of resurrecting law faculty debates over curriculum, one wonders, given the reduced
hours devoted to the basic business associations courses in most law schools, just how many students
graduate law school without ever having heard of a freeze-out merger, even in the corporate context.
198. See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 192.
199. RUPA § 601(4) (1993).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
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provisions.201 Partners can structure the transaction as a sale of assets or
a sale of partnership interests, an assumption of liabilities, and an admission
of new partners. 202 While the existence of statutory merger provisions
might allow some aspects of such a transaction to be handled in a more
convenient way/03 corporate planners, who have the merger option, have
nevertheless frequently structured business acquisitions or combinations as
asset or stock purchases rather than as statutory mergers.204 Indeed, this
fact has led to repeated litigation over whether courts should deem asset or
stock deals to be de facto mergers.205
Moreover, for LLC statutes to allow mergers based upon majority vote
departs from long-established partnership norms. Barring contrary
agreement, admission of new members to a partnership or a limited
partnership, or a transaction outside the ordinary course of a partnership's
or limited partnership's business, requires a unanimous vote.206 This, at
least, raises the question of which norm matches the expectations of most
parties entering the sort of closely held businesses likely to become an
LLC. Worse, LLC statutes usually follow the partnership norm with respect
to admission of new members; explicitly requiring unanimous consent in
the absence of other agreement. 207 For the same statute to allow LLC

201. The RUPA introduced such provisions. RUPA §§ 905, 906, 907 (1993).
202. See GEVURTZ, supra note 3, at 42-43 (Supp. 1994).
203. For example, it avoids the need for extensive paperwork to transfer title for each piece of
property. !d. at 893.
204. !d. at 872-89.
205. See. e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); Applestein v. United Bd. &
Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Ch.), affd, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960).
206. UPA § 18(g), (h) (1914); RULPA §§ 301 (bXI), 401, 403(a), 1105 (1985).
207. ALA. CODE§ 10-12-3l(a)(l) (1994); ALASKA STAT.§ 10.50.155(1)(8) (Supp. 1994); ARlZ.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 29-73l(B) (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-80l(a)(l) (Michie Supp. 1993);
CAL. CORP. CODE§ 17100(a)(J) (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 7-80-701 (West Supp.
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-30J(b)(l) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.4232 (West Supp.
1994); GA. CODE ANN.§ 14-IJ-505(b) (1994); IDAHO CODE§ 53-640(a) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
805, para. 180/10-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-6-1(1) (Bums Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 490A.903(1) (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-7618 (Supp. 1993); 1994
Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 53(1) (Baldwin); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12:1332(A)(l) (West
Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 69l(l)(A) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS
& ASS'NS § 4A-601(b)(1) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4506(1) (West Supp. 1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 347.079(3)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); Mo!IIT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-80J(J)(a) (1994); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 304-C:23(II)(a) (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 42:2B-2J(b)(l) (WestSupp. 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-36(A)(l) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-0J(b)(J) (Supp.
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035(A)(2) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.245(2)(a)
(Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-36(a) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-232-102 (Supp. 1994);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 4.01(BXI) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b122 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13. 1-1038. 1(1) (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211,
§ 301(2)(a) (West); W.VA. CODE§ 31-IA-34(c)(J) (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 183.0404(2)(b)
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freeze-outs when the parties have agreed to this possibility, such provisions
seem unexceptional. A problem exists, however, when one views such
powers in conjunction with the ability, under many acts, of a majority in
an LLC to amend the operating agreement. 212 Could the majority amend
the operating agreement to allow for expulsion and then kick out the
minority? This seems to be the literal result, which again illustrates that
statutes should require a unanimous vote (barring other agreement) to
amend the operating agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION
Given the speed with which LLC statutes have spread across the country,
especially without the guidance of a uniform act, one can expect a period
of flux as states modify their provisions. In making those modifications,
states would do well to structure their LLC acts in such a way as to
minimize problems from squeeze-outs and freeze-outs. This Article leads
to several specific suggestions:
(1) LLC acts should generally prohibit salaries to LLC members barring
other agreement.
(2) LLC acts should not allow (unless otherwise agreed) for amendment
of the operating agreement (or the articles to the extent they contain
provisions that go beyond mere formalities) by less than unanimous vote.
(3) LLC statutes should follow a limited partnership model giving
members a cash-out right in the absence of other agreement.
(4) LLC acts should either not allow (barring other agreement) a
majority of the membership to sell substantially all the firm's assets over
the objection of the minority or, at least, not allow such a sale to the
majority.
(5) LLC statutes should either not contain provisions that allow (barring
other agreement) mergers based upon less than unanimous vote and with
nonequity consideration, or, at least, not allow such mergers with an entity
owned by the majority interest.
(6) If drafters decide to create a default rule giving the majority in an
LLC the power to expel the minority, this should be made explicit in the
statute.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-126(4) (1994); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211, § 304(1)(c) (West); WIS.
STAT. ANN.§ 183.0802(1)(c) (West Supp. 1994).
212. See supra text accompanying note 86.

